The ability to detect and correct action errors is paramount to safe and efficient goaldirected behaviors. Existing work on the neural underpinnings of error processing and post-error behavioral adaptations has led to the development of several mechanistic theories of error processing. These theories can be roughly grouped into adaptive and maladaptive theories. While adaptive theories propose that errors trigger a cascade of processes that will result in improved behavior after error commission, maladaptive theories hold that error commission momentarily impairs behavior. Neither group of theories can account for all available data, as different empirical studies find both impaired and improved post-error behavior. This article attempts a synthesis between the predictions made by prominent adaptive and maladaptive theories. Specifically, it is proposed that errors invoke a nonspecific cascade of processing that will rapidly interrupt and inhibit ongoing behavior and cognition, as well as orient attention toward the source of the error. It is proposed that this cascade follows all unexpected action outcomes, not just errors. In the case of errors, this cascade is followed by error-specific, controlled processing, which is specifically aimed at (re) tuning the existing task set. This theory combines existing predictions from maladaptive orienting and bottleneck theories with specific neural mechanisms from the wider field of cognitive control, including from error-specific theories of adaptive post-error processing. The article aims to describe the proposed framework and its implications for post-error slowing and post-error accuracy, propose mechanistic neural circuitry for post-error processing, and derive specific hypotheses for future empirical investigations.
| IN TRO DUCT IO N
The ability to adapt behavior after erroneous actions is one of the key components of human cognitive control. Correcting current and avoiding future errors is paramount to survival. These abilities are the centerpiece of the scientific field of performance monitoring. Research into the neurophysiological and behavioral changes associated with error processing has generated several influential theories over the past few decades, which seek to explain how the human brain reacts to error commission. While many existing theories entail unique mechanisms and propose specific corollaries, one factor by which all theories can be roughly classified is whether they propose that psychological and neural processes triggered by error commission are maladaptive or adaptive. Empirically, this classification can be made based on whether a theory predicts that error commission is ultimately beneficial or detrimental to post-error behavior. Specifically, adaptive theories propose that errors trigger a cascade of neural processes that represents a remedial effort of the cognitive system, which is explicitly targeted at avoiding future errors. Therefore, adaptive theories propose that behavioral accuracy should improve after error commission. Maladaptive theories, on the other hand, propose that error commission has adverse effects on ongoing cognitive and/or motor processing. Therefore, according to maladaptive theories, error commission should further impair subsequent behavior.
Importantly, empirical studies of post-error changes in accuracy have provided an inconclusive picture, with some demonstrating improvements and some demonstrating decrements of behavioral accuracy after errors. The current article contains an attempt to bridge the divide between adaptive and maladaptive theories by proposing a novel theory of error processing. This "adaptive orienting theory" combines mechanisms and predictions from existing maladaptive and adaptive theories and proposes a neural framework for the implementation of its key components. This novel framework can potentially explain previously incommensurable findings in the literature.
| Overview and structure of this article
The article will begin with a brief overview (Section I) that outlines major existing theories of error processing, paying special attention to whether they can be classified as maladaptive or adaptive based on their (implicit or explicit) predictions regarding post-error changes in accuracy. For more detailed reviews of such theories, the reader is referred to more comprehensive reviews of the performance-monitoring literature (Alexander & Brown, 2010; Desmet, Fias, & Brass, 2011; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007; Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014; van Veen & Carter, 2006) . This overview section is followed by an outline and review of selected empirical studies that specifically focused on post-error changes in accuracy (Section II). The review of these studies will highlight that, at first glance, there is empirical support for both adaptive and maladaptive theories: some studies find impaired accuracy after errors, whereas others report improvements. Readers who are already familiar with the most common theories of error processing as well as the literature on post-error accuracy changes can skip these two sections. The subsequent section (Section III) will focus on outlining the theoretical and neural framework proposed in the current paper. To preview, the core tenets of the proposal are these:
1. Errors are specific instances of a broader class of psychological events-namely, task-relevant unexpected events.
2. All task-related unexpected events trigger an immediate, stereotypic cascade of automatic processing. This cascade has the following properties:
a It is aimed at quickly identifying the source of the expectancy violation.
b It is automatic (i.e., not controlled) and stereotypical (i.e., not specific to action errors).
c It is a two-step cascade, which involves two sequential processes:
i Inhibition of the ongoing task-set and active motor representations.
ii Orienting of attentional focus to the source of the violation.
d Both steps are controlled by specific neural mechanisms.
e This cascade facilitates subsequent adaptive processing that is specific to the nature of the violation.
3. If the violation is identified as stemming from an error, the automated cascade is then followed by further, errorspecific controlled processing (however, if the violation stems from something other than errors, a different set of controlled processes may be needed and may be appropriately invoked). These controlled processes have the following properties:
a They can be specific to errors.
b They can be specific to the nature of the error.
c They are (relatively) slow and may involve conscious effort.
As should be already evident, this theory includes several already proposed tenets of certain maladaptive theories of error processing (see below), but ultimately proposes that post-error processing is inherently adaptive (i.e., it is geared at improving behavior). The final Section IV will describe some key implications and predictions of the proposed framework regarding post-error slowing, post-error accuracy, and other key issues in regards to human performance monitoring.
emission processes. Most theories can be classified on this continuum between error-related effects on input systems (sensory) versus output systems (motor), and many theories are in fact hybrid theories, in that they postulate that adaptive processing after errors targets the interaction between sensory, decision, and motor processes. Perhaps the earliest explicit theory of adaptive post-error processing comes from Laming (D. R. J. Laming, 1968) . The core proposal of this theory is that error commission leads to a delay of the processing of perceptual information after errors. This is grounded in the notion that subjects may begin sampling information before task-relevant, imperative stimuli are even presented. This may adversely influence the stimulus-triggered decision process, thereby leading to errors. Therefore, delaying the onset of this information sampling process would prevent the occurrence of errors that result from such premature sampling. Laming indicates the proposed adaptive nature of this mechanism, by stating that "It is likely that subjects do not do this habitually" (p. 214, D. R. J. Laming, 1968) , which implies that post-error processes are invoked in a controlled fashion to positively affect posterror behavior.
Some neuroscientific evidence for theories of errorrelated changes in sensory sampling comes from studies that investigated activity in early sensory brain areas following error commission. For example, King et al. (King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010 ) measured activity in the fusiform face area following errors in a task in which face information was the task-relevant sensory information. The authors found that BOLD activity in this early sensory region was significantly increased after errors compared to correct responses. Similar findings have been reported by Danielmeier et al. (Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011) , who compared neural activity in early sensory color and motion-related brain regions (V4 and MT) after error commission. In a moving dots paradigm, they varied the relevant stimulus dimension and found that BOLD activity in the early sensory area that processes the respective information was increased following errors, whereas activity in the irrelevant area decreased (see also Danielmeier et al., 2015) . While these studies did not specifically investigate whether the timing of the onset of sensory sampling is changed after errors (as proposed by Laming), they do lend support for the notion that sensory processing is in fact altered in ways that may reflect an adaptive tuning of early sensory activity after errors.
While theories like Laming's pertain mostly to sensory processing after errors, other theories have proposed that error commission leads to an adaptive change in motor processes related to response emission. Many such theories are motivated by the fact that reaction times are slowed after errors (post-error slowing, PES, Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977) . Importantly, while many motor theories of post-error processing are motivated by the presence of the wellestablished PES effect, the presence of PES in itself does not provide direct evidence for delayed motor processing after errors, as it could easily result from delayed processing on any level that precedes response emission (sensory, decisionmaking, motor). However, Ridderinkhof (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Ridderinkhof, Span, & van der Molen, 2002) , for example, proposes that PES is indeed a reflection of increased motor-system inhibition on the next trial. This is based on the proposition that inappropriate response tendencies are selectively inhibited after error commission, which is derived from the empirical finding that slower responses after errors exhibit a stronger reduction of interference from taskirrelevant stimuli. Specifically, such interference from taskirrelevant stimuli can be measured through reaction time differences between correct responses to incongruent stimulus material (i.e., stimuli that simultaneously trigger correct and incorrect response tendencies) and congruent stimulus material (stimuli that only trigger the correct response). The greater the RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials, the greater the interference of the incongruent stimulus material. Ridderinkhof et al. showed that trials with greater PES are accompanied by a reduction of this interference. This is interpreted as selective inhibition of inappropriate motor tendencies after errors (i.e., an adaptive suppression of motor activity aimed at reducing the interference of conflicting stimulus material). Hence, like the sensory theories discussed in the previous paragraph, this theory proposes an adaptive process that aims to improve behavior after errors by resolving the potential interference of conflicting stimuli. However, unlike in sensory theories, motor theories like the one of Ridderinkhof et al. propose that this process operates at the motor (output) level rather than the sensory level (input). These theories are further supported by findings of increased connectivity between brain systems subserving performance monitoring on the one hand and motor emission on the other hand (e.g., Narayanan, Cavanagh, Frank, & Laubach, 2013) .
In addition to theories that focus relatively strongly on the adaptation of either sensory or motor processes, many theories exist that propose adaptive effects on intermediate stages. For example, within the context of the influential conflictmonitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) , it has been suggested that speed-accuracy trade-off is enacted after errors. According to several proposals, this is done by increasing the motor/response threshold, that is, the amount of sensory evidence or decision certainty (Cavanagh et al., 2011; Purcell & Kiani, 2016) required to initiate a motor response. Behaviorally, such theories are supported by data from drift-diffusion modeling, in which reaction time distributions are modeled and compared between post-error and postcorrect trials to infer changes in underlying computations leading up to response emission. Such studies show that "boundary separation," a drift-diffusion model parameter roughly reflecting response caution, is significantly increased following errors (Dutilh et al., 2012) .
As is evident from the above, there are many theories that propose that behavior is adaptively tuned after error commission. While these theories differ in the proposed implementation, they all commonly predict that post-error behavior will ultimately become more accurate. In the following, before describing maladaptive theories, the behavioral phenomenon of post-error slowing will be examined in more detail, as it is the most commonly studied behavioral index of post-error adaptation, and is controversially discussed in both adaptive and maladaptive theories.
2.1.1 | Post-error slowing as an adaptive mechanism PES denotes a typical behavioral pattern of relative slowing of reaction times on correct trials that follow errors compared to trials that follow correct responses (D. Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977) . Almost every adaptive theory of error processing postulates that PES is an expression of controlled, adaptive processing triggered by errors, which is aimed at increasing post-error accuracy (Debener et al., 2005; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004) . Behaviorally, this assertion is supported by several observations. First, the degree of PES between individuals correlates with the post-error change in accuracy, with individuals exhibiting greater PES showing greater improvements in post-error accuracy (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003) . PES also correlates with increased overall accuracy, suggesting that it is an interindividual marker of better cognitive control ability (Steinborn, Flehmig, Bratzke, & Schroter, 2012) . Second, on the intrasubject level, it has been shown that PES is increased within subjects when accurate behavior is emphasized (Ullsperger & Szymanowski, 2004) . Third, PES is often associated with error awareness, that is, the conscious detection of errors (Klein et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001; Wessel, Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2011) , lending further credence to the notion that PES may be an expression of adaptive, controlled processing (though see Logan & Crump, 2010) .
Therefore, before considering the maladaptive theories, it is worth noting that any theory of error processing needs to account for the fact that PES is associated with more accurate behavior within and between subjects, and some evidence suggests that it is associated with controlled (potentially conscious) processing.
| Maladaptive theories
The core proposal of all maladaptive theories is that errors momentarily impair cognitive processing and therefore result in increased error rates on post-error trials. Perhaps the most prominent maladaptive theory is the orienting theory (Notebaert et al., 2009) . It is primarily based upon the empirical observation that PES only present when errors, relative to correct responses, constitute an infrequent action outcome (within the context of the task, and likely in the real world). In their studies, task difficulty is increased to a point where correct responses are more infrequent than errors, upon which PES is no longer present and reaction times are actually significantly slower following correct trials instead (Notebaert et al., 2009; Nunez Castellar, Kuhn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010) . The authors explain this pattern by suggesting that errors, because they are infrequent and therefore unexpected, are followed by an orienting response-a cascade of autonomic and central nervous system activity in response to an unexpected change in the environment (Sokolov, 1963) , which is thought to be an index of the degree of attentional capture by an unexpected event (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986 ). Notebaert and colleagues therefore propose that PES is a byproduct of the attentional capture associated with the orienting response triggered by infrequent errors. Furthermore, they explicitly distinguish their theory from the adaptive theories by predicting that this orienting response will lead to a greater likelihood of error commission (Houtman & Notebaert, 2013) . They explicitly state this in their original paper: "In our account, post-error slowing is not considered as an adaptive effect" (Notebaert et al., 2009) .
The relationship between PES and post-error accuracy was elucidated in experiments by Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) . There, the duration of the intertrial interval (ITI) was systematically varied, changing the time for the cognitive system to make behavioral adjustments after errors. While shorter ITIs lead to worse post-error accuracy (which is in line with the predictions made by adaptive theories), they also resulted in increased PES, which is at odds with the proposition of adaptive theories that PES reflects adaptive processing and correlates with post-error increases in accuracy. In contrast to the orienting theory, Jentzsch and Dudschig interpret their finding not in context of the orienting response, but rather within a bottleneck account, according to which error processing is a resource-intensive process that interferes with the processing of post-error stimuli. In case of short ITIs, resources are still bound by ongoing error processing, therefore leading to greater PES and decreased posterror accuracy. However, a limitation of this account is put forward by proponents of the orienting account, who point out that the bottleneck account cannot explain why PES is reversed when correct responses become the more infrequent action outcome (Houtman & Notebaert, 2013) .
More neurophysiological evidence for maladaptive theories comes from three recent papers. Purcell and Kiani (2016) found that sensitivity to sensory information was decreased after error commission (however, they also found that the "decision bound" was increased after errors, in line with some adaptive theories; see below). Similar findings were reported by Buzzell et al. (Buzzell, Beatty, Paquette, Roberts, & McDonald, 2017) , who found decreased posterior visual N1 ERP amplitudes to visual stimuli that occurred after errors-an effect that was once again increased for short ITIs (along with the strongest behavioral impairment of posterror accuracy). In line with these findings, Houtman and Notebaert (2013) found that signal detection performance on a rapid-serial visual presentation (RSVP) task was significantly impaired if the response to a flanker stimulus presented before the RSVP array was incorrect. Lastly, van den Brink and colleagues (van den Brink, Wynn, & Nieuwenhuis, 2014) found that errors lead to an interruption of the low-frequency phase entrainment that is usually observed during the presentation of chronologically regular stimulus material, further supporting the observation that errors can have rapid, adverse effects on ongoing perceptual processes.
| S ECTI O N II : BEHA VI ORA L S TUDI ES O F P OS T-ERR OR ACCU RAC Y ARE I NC ONC LUS I VE
As outlined above, adaptive and maladaptive theories of error processing can be easily distinguished by their predictions regarding post-error accuracy: adaptive theories predict increases in accuracy after errors, while maladaptive theories predict decreases. Notably, however, the empirical picture does not seem to favor either outcome. Historically, this is reflected already in early seminal works by Rabbitt and Rodgers (1977) and Laming (1979) . While Laming found increases in post-error accuracy in choice reaction time tasks, Rabbitt and Rodgers reported post-error accuracy decreases. The following years have generated further findings in favor of both outcomes. Somewhat notably, the type of task itself does not seem to play a role in whether a study will find a relative increase or a decrease in accuracy after errors. For example, while several studies using the flanker task have found increases in accuracy following errors compared to correct trials (Grutzmann, Endrass, Klawohn, & Kathmann, 2014; Marco-Pallares, Camara, Munte, & RodriguezFornells, 2008; Pontifex et al., 2011; Seifert, von Cramon, Imperati, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012) , other studies using the same paradigm have shown either the opposite pattern (Arnstein, Lakey, Compton, & Kleinow, 2011; Franken, van Strien, Franzek, & van de Wetering, 2007) Klein et al., 2007) , some showing decreases (Bombeke, Schouppe, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2013; Carp & Compton, 2009; Houtman & Notebaert, 2013; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Jonker, Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; Notebaert et al., 2009; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; Van der Borght, Braem, Stevens, & Notebaert, 2016) , and some showing no change (e.g., Hajcak et al., 2003) .
As already discussed in the section on maladaptive theories, the duration of the ITI may play a key role in how errors affect accuracy. This possibility had already been raised by Laming (1979) , who discussed the disparity of his findings compared to those of Rabbitt & Rodgers (1977) thusly:
Rabbitt has always worked with a short response-stimulus interval (RSI), usually 20 ms and never greater than 220 ms. [. . .] If the stimulus presented on trial (e 1 1) is not a repetition of the error-trial stimulus, S e , it will (given that the RSI is short) interact with the trace of S e somewhere in the visual processing system, making it difficult for the subject both to discover that the error-trial response was wrong and to identify the new stimulus." (p. 206, Laming, 1979 ).
In conclusion, any theory of error processing needs to account for the fact that long ITIs lead to increased posterror accuracy, whereas shorter intervals lead to impaired post-error accuracy.
| Goals for a unified theory
Based on the arguments and studies presented in the previous paragraphs, a unified theory that seeks to bridge the empirical gap between the adaptive and maladaptive theories of error processing will have to do three things:
1. It has to explain why post-error accuracy is decreased for short ITIs, yet increased for long intervals (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; D. Laming, 1979) .
2. It has to explain why PES appears to reflect an adaptive process that is associated with accurate behavior between (Hajcak et al., 2003; Steinborn et al., 2012) and within (Ullsperger & Szymanowski, 2004) subjects, yet is greatest under conditions in which post-error accuracy is worst (Buzzell et al., 2017; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009 ).
3. It has to explain why PES (regardless of whether it serves an adaptive purpose or not) disappears when errors are no longer an unexpected action outcome (Notebaert et al., 2009) .
As is evident, no existing theory provides a unified framework that can explain all three phenomena. For example, WESSEL | most adaptive theories, as well as the maladaptive bottleneck account, explain (1) and (2), but not (3). The maladaptive orienting theory explains (3), but it does not explain (2).
| S ECTI O N II I : A N ADA P TI VE ORI ENT I NG TH EORY O F ERRO R P ROCE S S I NG
The following contains an outline of a proposed adaptive orienting theory of error processing. This theory combines features from preexisting adaptive and maladaptive theories of error processing and uses empirical data from both the field of performance monitoring, as well as the more general literature on cognitive control (novelty processing, attention, inhibitory control) to formulate its hypothetical propositions. The theory will be outlined in a step-by-step fashion by posing sequential theoretical statements, followed by empirical evidence where available.
| Theoretical Statement 1: Errors are specific instances of a broader class of psychological events-task-relevant unexpected events
A large part of this theory is grounded in the assumption that an error is-in most cases-an unexpected action outcome. Specifically, an error will involve either a mismatch between an action plan and the actually performed action (e.g., Coles, Scheffers, & Holroyd, 2001) , or between the performed action and the action outcome (e.g, Gentsch, Ullsperger, & Ullsperger, 2009; Wessel, Danielmeier, Morton, & Ullsperger, 2012) . This assumption is shared with the maladaptive orienting response theory of Notebaert and colleagues (2009) . In addition to Notebaert and colleagues' work, this assumption is empirically supported by studies that have shown that the neural systems underlying the processing of action errors and unexpected action outcomes are overlapping. Findings from both fMRI data and scalp EEG support this assertion. First, Gentsch and colleagues (2009) have shown that the error-related negativity (ERN, Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993) , a prominent ERP observed after errors, shares a neural generator with the feedback-related negativity (FRN, Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997) , which occurs after unexpected feedback (or, in Gentsch et al.'s study, after the unexpected absence of action feedback). This shows that activity of the neural generator of the ERN can also be invoked after correct responses-specifically, when the action outcome of a correct response is unexpectedly absent. Converging evidence for this comes from an fMRI study, in which the neural generators of the ERN in the posterior medial frontal cortex were found to be active both for selfproduced action errors and unexpectedly absent action feedback (Ullsperger, Nittono, & von Cramon, 2007) .
In a second example, we found that the N2/P3 complex after unexpected action outcomes shares a generator with the ERN as well . That study also included a conjunction analysis of fMRI data, which showed that the brain networks that exhibit an increased BOLD response after errors and unexpectedly altered action feedback after correct responses significantly overlap (Figure 1) , which provides converging evidence from another imaging modality. Notably, this overlap included most or all regions commonly assumed to underlie error processing-namely, the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC), the bilateral inferior frontal and insular cortices, and regions in the midbrain (Kerns et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) . A subsequent lesion study then provided further evidence for the overlap between the networks subserving error processing and the processing of unexpected action outcomes: lesions to the prefrontal cortex that reduced the ERN and PES also reduced the N2/P3 after unexpected action outcomes, as well as the motor slowing typically found after such events (Wessel, Klein, Ott, & Ullsperger, 2014) . Further in line with these findings, another fMRI study found that unexpectedly correct and unexpectedly incorrect trials activate overlapping regions in pMFC (Schiffer, Krause, & Schubotz, 2014) . Finally, investigations of the autonomic nervous system support the assertion that error processing in the brain is related to the expectedness of the action outcome: by comparing the pupil response during easy and hard tasks, Braem et al. (Braem, Coenen, Bombeke, van Bochove, & Notebaert, 2015) found that errors lead to a greater pupil dilation response when they were committed in easy (compared to difficult) task conditions-that is, the error-related autonomic response was significantly modulated by error expectancy (see also Brown & Braver, 2005) .
Taken together, these (and other) studies suggest that errors invoke the activity of a more generic network for the detection of unexpected action outcomes (or, even more general, any type of task-relevant unexpected event, Wessel & Aron, 2017) . Importantly, to preface the next section, this is not to say that there are no unique components to each process. However, the current theory rests on solid converging evidence for the fact that part of the neural activity that follows errors can be accounted for by the fact that errors are unexpected events.
4.2 | Theoretical Statement 2: Task-related unexpected events trigger a quick, stereotypic cascade of automatic processing
The second key tenet of the current theory is the proposition that all unexpected events, including errors, are followed by an automatic cascade that consists of two rapid, sequential processes-both of which are aimed at interrupting ongoing processing and shift attention to the source of the unexpected event. The first process is a rapid inhibitory control process, which aims to inhibit ongoing cognitive and motor representations. The second process is subsequent attentional orienting, away from the current task-set representation, toward the source of the expectancy violation. Notably, it is proposed that the initial inhibition benefits the subsequent attentional orienting by interrupting the current task-set representation and freeing up resources toward a search process aimed at identifying the source of the expectancy violation. It is further proposed that this combined automatic cascade of inhibition and orienting ultimately aids controlled processing (which can be highly error specific; see theoretical Statement 3 below and Figure 2 ). It is explicitly proposed that this initial automatic sequence of processing is not specific to errors, but instead occurs after any type of task-related unexpected event (Wessel & Aron, 2017) In the following, evidence for the proposed automatic sequence of processes following unexpected events will be presented and the neural mechanisms purportedly underlying both stages of this cascade will be described.
| Corollary 2.1.: Unexpected events lead to rapid inhibition
The current theory proposes that, as part of the purported automatic cascade, unexpected task-related events of any FIGU RE 1 Errors and unexpected outcomes of correct actions share a common neural processing network (figures based on data from Wessel et al., 2012) . Left: Independent component analysis of scalp EEG data shows that ERN/Pe to errors and N2/P3 to errors load on the same independent component. Components were selected based on their contributions to the ERN, then back-projected into channel space, and plotted with respect to both errors and unexpected action outcomes (for details, see Wessel et al., 2012) . Line graphs depict the group-averaged ERP difference waves; red: errors-correct responses; blue: unexpected-expected action outcomes on correct trials. Shaded areas denote standard error of the mean. Right: Conjunction BOLD-fMRI of the two independent contrasts errors versus correct responses and unexpected versus expected action outcomes on correct trials. Data visualized using MRIcroGL F IGUR E 2 Hypothesized sequence of psychological processes after error commission. The initial expectancy violation (error) leads to automatic inhibition of the current task set and ongoing motor activity, followed by attentional reorienting toward the source of the violation. This automatic cascade, which is not specific to errors, is then followed by controlled processing (which is error specific), and is ultimately geared at increasing accuracy. Importantly, the current theory predicts that the initial automatic cascade is beneficial to the controlled processes, and therefore ultimately geared at improving behavior kind (errors, unexpected perceptual events, unexpected action outcomes) invoke the activity of a frontobasal ganglia mechanism for inhibitory control (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Jahanshahi, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015; Wessel & Aron, 2017) . This mechanism and the underlying neural circuitry will be described in the following.
A frontobasal ganglia system for inhibitory control The neural circuitry underlying this well-characterized mechanism consists of the presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA, Enriquez-Geppert, Konrad, Pantev, & Huster, 2010; Li, Huang, Constable, & Sinha, 2006; Nachev, Wydell, O'Neill, Husain, & Kennard, 2007) , the right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC, Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Wessel, Conner, Aron, & Tandon, 2013) and the subthalamic nucleus of the basal ganglia (STN, Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Kuhn et al., 2004; Wessel, Ghahremani et al., 2016) . The activity of this frontobasal ganglia mechanism is most commonly studied in paradigms like the stop-signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984) or go/no-go tasks (Donders, 1969) . In these tasks, participants have to rapidly stop an already initiated action before its actual emission (Wessel, 2017b) . Therefore, this mechanism is most often characterized as a motor inhibition circuit (even though recent evidence suggests it may affect even nonmotor representations, see below). Notably, the regions that constitute the frontobasal ganglia network show increased BOLD activity in many studies of error processing Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010) , with converging evidence provided by other imaging domains. For example, EEG signatures that index successful motor inhibition in stop-signal-type tasks (Kok, Ramautar, De Ruiter, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2004; Wessel & Aron, 2015) share neural generators with parts of the neural activity after errors (Wessel, 2016a; Wessel, Jenkinson et al., 2016) , which suggests that they have a common neural generator (Onton, Westerfield, Townsend, & Makeig, 2006; Wessel, 2016b) . Furthermore, the subcortical STN, a core part of the purported inhibitory function of the frontobasal ganglia network, exhibits increased local field potential activity after errors (Cavanagh, Sanguinetti, Allen, Sherman, & Frank, 2014; Siegert et al., 2014) and unexpected events in general (Bockova et al., 2011; Wessel, Jenkinson et al., 2016) . Lastly, just like action stopping (N. , both action errors and unexpected action outcomes show increased frontocentral to right frontolateral betafrequency EEG coherence (Wessel, Ullsperger et al., 2016) . Moreover, the degree of this coherence (which could reflect the communication between rIFC and pre-SMA, N. C. within the first 500 ms following error commission/the occurrence of unexpected action outcomes predicts the degree of motor slowing on the next trial (mirroring the timing and properties of the STN found for errors in Siegert et al., 2014) . While interpreting such common activity of brain areas (or common neural signatures in general) under different experimental circumstances as evidence for the activation of a common psychological process constitutes inappropriate reverse inference (Poldrack, 2011) , it can be helpful in theory and hypothesis generation. This interpretation is further supported by additional converging evidence discussed in the next paragraph.
Corticomotor inhibition after unexpected events Perhaps the most convincing argument for the involvement of inhibitory control immediately after unexpected events (such as errors) comes from investigations of corticospinal excitability (CSE), which can be measured using transcranial magnetic stimulation). Suppression of CSE, especially below a task-free baseline, is a much more direct, physiological index of motor-system inhibition (compared to the observation of activity in brain areas often associated with inhibitory control). Outright action stopping leads to a measurable CSE suppression in the muscle representation that is targeted by inhibition (Coxon, Stinear, & Byblow, 2006) . Notably, one characteristic property of the frontobasal ganglia inhibitory control network is that it not only suppresses the target muscle, but it also suppresses CSE in task-unrelated motor effectors, especially when the mechanism is rapidly recruited in reactive fashion (Badry et al., 2009; Majid, Cai, George, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2012; Wessel, Reynoso, & Aron, 2013) . Moreover, this "global" CSE suppression is related to the activity of the STN on a trial-by-trial level (Wessel, Ghahremani et al., 2016) , which provides a direct association between the activity of the frontobasal ganglia network and motor-system inhibition. A recent study from nonhuman animals provides further causal evidence for this association. Artificially de-activating STN via optogenetics after an unexpected event reduced the inhibitory motor effects that unexpected events had on ongoing behavior-in this case, interrupting licking bouts (Fife et al., 2017) . Most importantly for the current theory, suppression of CSE has been found after both errors (Amengual et al., 2013) and unexpected events in general . Moreover, this suppression shows the same nonselective property as observed in the stop-signal task, at least for unexpected perceptual events-namely, even task-unrelated effectors are affected and CSE is suppressed even below a resting baseline . This effect was observed with very little delay after the onset of the unexpected event (150 ms). Based on these findings, the current theory proposes that unexpected events evoke rapid inhibitory control, which is likely mediated by the frontobasal ganglia system.
A model for cognitive inhibition?
In addition to motor inhibition, the current theory proposes that the inhibitory effort after errors and other unexpected events also affects cognitive representations (such as the current task set). It is suggested that this is an adaptive function, which allows a quicker subsequent shift of attentional engagement, away from the current task-set representation and toward the source of the error/unexpected event (see Corollary 2.2 below). There is some recent empirical evidence for the proposition that suppression of cognitive activity after unexpected events is mediated by the activity of the frontobasal ganglia inhibition network (Wessel, Jenkinson et al., 2016) . In that study, unexpected sounds were presented during working memory maintenance periods in a verbal working memory task, which lead to deficits in working memory accuracy. Importantly, the degree of this disruption was directly related to the single-trial activity of the frontobasal ganglia inhibitory control network, measured both on the scalp and in the subcortical STN. Specifically, single-trial activation increases in frontobasal ganglia activity mediated the adverse influence of surprise on working memory. The current theory interprets these results as demonstrating an inhibitory influence of the frontobasal ganglia circuit on ongoing cognitive representations.
The idea that unexpected events can lead to an inhibition of ongoing cognitive representations is-until now-based on only a single study and needs further testing. However, the wider framework of how unexpected events inhibit both motor and cognitive processing also proposes a potential neural basis for the interruption via the frontobasal ganglia circuit, which generates further direct hypothesis for empirical tests (Wessel & Aron, 2017) . Specifically, it is proposed that ongoing cognitive representations may be susceptible to inhibition when they are represented in reverberant thalamocortical loops (Chatham, Frank, & Badre, 2014; Hazy, Frank, & O'Reilly, 2007) . Importantly, motor inhibition via the frontobasal ganglia mechanism is purportedly implemented on a mechanistic level by interrupting active representations in those thalamocortical motor loops via the output nuclei of the basal ganglia (the globus pallidus internus and the substantia nigra pars reticulata). It is proposed that this influence can also extend to other representations that are maintained in such thalamocortical loops. In this context, it is important to mention that short-term visuospatial working memory (Vogel & Machizawa, 2004) , which is likely maintained near primary sensory areas (Ester, Serences, & Awh, 2009; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Lara & Wallis, 2014) , is not susceptible to interruptions by the frontobasal ganglia mechanism (Wessel, 2016a) . This provides some preliminary evidence for the association between thalamocortical storage and susceptibility to interruption by the frontobasal ganglia system. Clearly, this part of the model is so far empirically underdeveloped. The strong interpretation of the current theory would be to propose that an inhibition process is necessary to enable a disengagement from ongoing cognitive representations, and is therefore necessary for the ability to switch to new representations. The weaker interpretation would be to propose that switching attention between two cognitive representations (in this case, the currently active task set on the one hand and the search for the source of the violation on the other) can be done in the absence of inhibition, but that inhibition is helpful when representations have to be rapidly interrupted-in which case, inhibition can be recruited to aid in actively suppressing the ongoing cognitive representation (e.g., the task set) to favor a quick switch toward the new representation (the search of the source of the error). Empirical studies have to examine which possibility is true (or whether the theory can be falsified by showing that there indeed is no inhibition after unexpected events at all). To facilitate the competitive testing of these three alternatives (inhibition is necessary, inhibition is helpful, no inhibition takes place), a clear-cut definition of inhibition, at least as it is understood within the current theory, is necessary. The current theory understands inhibition as an active process, implemented via a specific frontobasal ganglia neural circuit, that actively operates on another process, in such a way that the process that is operated upon is diminished in its activity. The latter process can be motor, in which case the theory would refer to the inhibitory process as motor inhibition, or it could be cognitive, in which case the theory would refer to cognitive inhibition. This anatomical-functional definition of the process can be referred to when testing competing hypotheses about the role of inhibition in the processing of unexpected events (such as action errors).
| Corollary 2.2.: Rapid inhibition is followed by attentional orienting
The current theory supposes that the second part of the automatic cascade of processing after unexpected events (such as errors) is characterized by the orienting of attention, which follows the initial inhibitory control implemented by the frontobasal ganglia system.
It is well established that errors are followed by a cascade of physiological processes akin to an orienting response (OR, Sokolov, 1963) . However, while existing maladaptive theories of error processing argue that this OR reflects an orienting of attentional away from the current task and is therefore ultimately detrimental to subsequent behavior (Notebaert et al., 2009; Nunez Castellar et al., 2010) , the current theory argues that the OR is part of an automatic cascade of processing after unexpected events that is ultimately geared to improve subsequent performance. The following will describe a selection of studies providing evidence for an OR after errors (an exhaustive review of all papers cannot be performed within the scope of this review; for an extensive review, see Ullsperger et al., 2010) . Then, evidence linking the error-related OR activity to specific brain networks that are involved in attentional shifting will be discussed. These studies will be used to argue that the error-related OR is part of an automatic, yet ultimately adaptive cascade of processing that leads to an orienting process-away from the current task set, and toward identifying the source of the error. One of the stipulations of the current theories is that this OR aids the identification of the exact source and nature of the expectancy violation-in case of errors, this means both the identification of the fact that the violation resulted from an error, as well as the subsequent identification of the factors that may have led to the error. This identification in turn aids the initiation of the controlled processes described in Theoretical Statement 3.
The orienting response to unexpected events The term orienting response/reflex describes a physiological cascade of increased autonomic arousal after unexpected stimuli (Sokolov, 1963) . It is characterized by heart rate deceleration (Graham & Clifton, 1966) , increased electrodermal activity (Coles, Gale, & Kline, 1971; Uno & Grings, 1965) , and pupil dilation (Stelmack & Siddle, 1982) . Notably, in line with the assertion that errors are a specific instance of unexpected events (see above), all of these psychophysiological changes can be observed after errors as well (e.g., Critchley, Tang, Glaser, Butterworth, & Dolan, 2005; Danev & de Winter, 1971; Hajcak et al., 2003; Wessel et al., 2011) . In an early observation of heart rate deceleration after errors, Danev & de Winter (1971) already proposed the interpretation of such autonomic activity as a post-error OR. However, this interpretation only recently gained renewed interest after Notebaert and colleagues' formulation of the maladaptive orienting theory of error processing (see above; Notebaert et al. 2009; Ullsperger et al., 2010) . In terms of psychological processes, the OR purportedly signifies a stimulus-driven shift of attention away from a currently active representation, toward the source of the unexpected event (Barcelo, Perianez, & Knight, 2002; Frith & Allen, 1983) . Many studies have hence sought to connect the psychological process of attentional orienting and the physiological orienting response to error processing. For example, several authors have long argued that the error positivity ERP (Pe; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000) signifies a more general P3-like potential that is not specific to errors, but rather reflects an orienting reflex (Davies, Segalowitz, Dywan, & Pailing, 2001; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009; Wessel et al., 2011) , similar to many P3-like potentials that are not error-specific (Barcelo et al., 2002; Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001; Nieuwenhuis, De Geus, & Aston-Jones, 2011) . In line with the interpretation of these P3 ERPs as indices of an error-related OR, Nunez-Castellar and colleagues (2010) found that when errors are the more likely action outcome, correct trials show an increased P3 compared to errors (instead of the typical reverse finding of a relative error positivity). Therefore, both data from central and autonomic nervous systems supports the assertion that errors evoke an OR.
The current theory proposes that inhibition and the OR are closely related, and may in fact be part of the same, nondissociable automatic cascade-in other words, any situation in which an OR is triggered will trigger automatic, reflexive inhibition. According to the theory, the inhibition of ongoing representations (motor and/or cognitive) facilitates the switching of attentional representations that is signified by the OR. The proposition that inhibition enables the OR (i.e., that the OR occurs chronologically after the inhibition) stems from the relative timing of the processes. The P3 appears to be the earliest overt sign of OR-related processing, and has a typical onset at around the 200-250 ms postevent mark after unexpected events. Inhibition of corticomotor excitability after unexpected events, however, can be observed as early as 150 ms after stimulus onset . However, it remains to be tested whether the inhibitory effort and the OR are related in a causal (or interacting) fashion, or whether they are independently triggered processes.
Neural systems underlying attentional orienting after unexpected events
The specific central nervous system circuits that mechanistically underlie the OR are currently still unclear. Many different neural regions have been shown to correlate with autonomic indices of the OR (Critchley, Corfield, Chandler, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000; Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000; Williams et al., 2000) . This is likely a consequence of the widespread effects that OR-eliciting events typically have on the entire nervous system. A prominent mechanistic model ascribes a key role in generating the OR to the norepinephrine (NE) system of the brainstem, whose ascending neuronal projections originate from the locus coeruleus (LC) to ostensibly generate the OR (Bouret & Sara, 2005; Sara & Bouret, 2012) . Specifically, LC BOLD activity relates to phasic changes in pupil dilation (de Gee et al., 2017; Murphy, Robertson, Balsters, & O'Connell, 2011) , a finding that has recently been confirmed using direct neuronal recordings from the LC (Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016) . Therefore, the post-error OR may be mechanistically caused by arousal signals ascending via the LC-NE system. These projections, in turn, could be underlying the initiation of the attentional orienting that occurs after errors (or unexpected events in general, Dayan & Yu, 2006) . For example, Corbetta and colleagues (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008) propose that the LC-NE system may provide an excitatory input into a ventrolateral stimulus-driven attentional "circuit breaker" system (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) , which they propose to underlie attentional shifts caused by salient stimuli. This ventrolateral system includes the temporoparietal junction (one of the purported generators of the P3 ERP, Yamaguchi & Knight, 1991 , 1992 and the anterior insular cortex (aIC). Both areas can be found in the conjunction BOLD contrast of errors and unexpected action outcomes -that is, both areas are significantly more active after errors and unexpected action outcomes in general. Related, yet independent, theoretical models of stimulus-driven attentional orienting in the brain ascribe a core function to the aIC as a hub of the so-called salience network (Goulden et al., 2014; Seeley et al., 2007; Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008) . Within that framework, it is proposed that the aIC receives the earliest input signal into the salience network, upon which the salience network then initiates a shift of attentional resources (Ham, Leff, de Boissezon, Joffe, & Sharp, 2013; Menon & Uddin, 2010) . Based on the close association between the aIC and the activity of the autonomic nervous system (Saper, 2002; Westerhaus & Loewy, 2001; Zhang, Dougherty, & Oppenheimer, 1998) as well as the density of NE receptors in the aIC (Palkovits et al., 1979; Talley, Rosin, Lee, Guyenet, & Lynch, 1996) , it is tempting to assume that the autonomic cascade that is potentially produced by ascending projections from the LC-NE system constitutes one input signal into the salience network, leading to an attentional shift via the aIC input into the salience network or the ventrolateral circuit breaker (the two terms may refer to overlapping neural and conceptual networks).
While the exact sequence of processing is not yet clear and the above proposition therefore remains conjectural, several strains of preliminary evidence lend support to the notion that the LC-NE system is specifically involved in post-error processing. Preliminary genetic studies indicate that genes that regulate the conversion of dopamine to noradrenaline may influence the interindividual degree of post-error slowing (Colzato, de Rover, van den Wildenberg, & Nieuwenhuis, 2013) . Moreover, transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation, whichamong several other effects-may increase LC firing and NE release (Dietrich et al., 2008; Frangos, Ellrich, & Komisaruk, 2015) , has also been found to increase PES (Sellaro et al., 2015) . Furthermore, task-related modulations in pupil diameter are related to trial-by-trial adjustments of the speed-accuracy trade-off (Murphy, Boonstra, & Nieuwenhuis, 2016) , reflecting the modulation of global neural gain associated with NE release (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005) .
The interaction between inhibition and attentional orienting As discussed, BOLD fMRI shows that the brain regions that constitute the frontobasal ganglia inhibitory control network (as well as the circuit breaker and salience networks, which involve the aIC as well as the temporoparietal junction), are all active following errors and unexpected events in general . However, BOLD fMRI cannot answer the question of temporal order of engagement of these networks owing to the lack of time resolution. Furthermore, as can be gleaned from above, these three networks involve partially overlapping brain regions, and are often ascribed different or overlapping functions based on context. It will probably need other methods (e.g., intracranial electrophysiology) to disentangle the exact order of processing after errors. As mentioned above, the current theory argues that attentional orienting is facilitated by preceding activity of the inhibitory control system, based on some nonsystematic evidence about timing differences between motor-system inhibition (150 ms postunexpected events) and the earliest indices of the OR (200 ms1 after unexpected events). Whether the temporal/causal order within this cascade is as predicted by the current theory (inhibition precedes and facilitates attentional orienting) remains to be tested in empirical studies. However, the current theory argues that this overall automatic cascade fulfills an adaptive function within the context of error processing, which distinguishes this theory from other existing theories of error processing (e.g., the orienting theory of Notebart et al., 2009) . Specifically, it is proposed that this automatic cascade enables error-specific, controlled processes ( Figure 3 ). These processes, as well as the reasoning for this assumption, will be discussed in the Theoretical Statement 3.
| Theoretical Statement 3: If the unexpected event is an action error, the automated cascade is followed by controlled processing
The current theory argues that, in the specific case of errors, the automatic cascade described above (which occurs for all unexpected events) is followed by error-specific, controlled processing, aimed at specifically adapting behavior to resolve the cause of the error. This assumes that the orienting of attention toward the source of the violation leads to a successful identification of the fact that an action error has been committed and was indeed the source of the violation (Figure 2 ).
There are many empirical studies that show adaptive tuning of motor or sensory activity after errors (for an exhaustive review, see Ullsperger et al., 2014) . A few have already been discussed in the section about adaptive theories of error processing in the above section King et al., 2010) . These studies show that task-relevant representations in early sensory areas are upregulated after errors, while task-irrelevant representations are downregulated (see also Maier, Yeung, & Steinhauser, 2011) . Other prominent findings suggest that errors lead to an adjustment of decision criteria (Purcell & Kiani, 2016; Schiffler, Bengtsson, & Lundqvist, 2017) , often by applying a more conservative threshold for motor emission . Key to the current theory are the following proposals: a These controlled adaptations are specific to the type and nature of the error.
The automatic cascade that precedes these controlled adaptations is beneficial to their implementation.
c These adaptive processes are deliberate, slower, and controlled.
Evidence for the first proposition can be found in other reviews . The focus of the following will be on the evidence that these post-error processes benefit from the engagement of the automatic cascade and are deliberately initiated. First, it is argued that the frontobasal ganglia network underlying inhibition (the first step of the automatic cascade) is beneficial to the subsequent implementation of adaptive post-error behaviors. Then, evidence is presented that links the subsequent OR to conscious awareness of errors, and it is argued that such error awareness may allow for more precise error-specific adaptations.
| Inhibitory control by the frontobasal ganglia system aids controlled processing
While it is primarily argued that the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) signals the need for specific adjustments made after errors , there is a lot of evidence that shows a relationship between the activity of the frontobasal ganglia pre-SMA/rIFC/STN network and the efficacy of post-error adjustments. For example, BOLD activity of the pre-SMA (Klein et al., 2007) as well as the integrity of white matter tracts in that region predict the amount of PES across subjects, a finding that is not predicted by strictly aMCC-centric theories of post-error adaptations. Moreover, similar relationships between brain activity and PES have been reported with regard to the rIFC: activity in this region correlates with PES (King et al., 2010) , and lesions to the rIFC lead to impaired PES (Molenberghs et al., 2009 ). Furthermore, the activity of the subcortical part of this network-namely, the STN of the basal ganglia-is related to the degree of PES as well (Cavanagh et al., 2014; Siegert et al., 2014) . The pattern of results with regard to the STN is particularly interesting: while Cavanagh et al. (2014) found that STN activity after the presentation of post-error stimuli correlates with PES, which would be predicted for a region that is directly involved in implementing PES, Siegert et al., (2014) found that early STN activity around 200-300 ms following the error itself (i.e., before the next stimulus is even presented) predicts PES on the subsequent trial. Notably, if STN activity is taken as an index of an active inhibitory effort on the motor system (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Wessel, Ghahremani et al., 2016) , inverse inference based on latter finding would generate the hypothesis that there is early inhibition that is not directly related to the execution of the subsequent motor response (as the next stimulus is not known yet), yet still predictive of PES. Therefore, this early STN activity, together with the empirical association between pre-SMA/rIFC and PES could speak in favor of the proposed cascade of processing: not only are errors followed by rapid inhibition, but this inhibitory effort is beneficial to subsequent adaptations. So far, this association has only been demonstrated for PES, and investigations of a potential relationship between the activity of the frontobasal ganglia inhibitory system and error-specific adaptations of sensory or decision-making systems are yet to be performed.
| Attentional orienting aids deliberate and error-specific adjustments
The current theory proposes that the early inhibitory process is followed by an OR (see above). Here, that argument is extended to propose that the intensity of this OR is FIGU RE 3 Neural systems underlying the automatic cascade and controlled processing following expectancy violation. The initial automatic cascade is mechanistically implemented via the frontobasal ganglia inhibitory control network (including pre-SMA, rIFC, and STN), followed by the brain system underlying attentional orienting, which include the LC-NE system as well as the purported salience or circuit breaker networks (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Seeley et al., 2007) , potentially via input through the aIC. The automatic cascade is then followed by error-specific, controlled processes, which depend on the nature of the error and can include the adaptive tuning of perceptual systems, an increase in the motor threshold (resulting in strategic PES), and/or a tuning of top-down attentional systems. The fMRI images in the Error-specific adaptation box are reproduced from , with kind permission from the authors proportional to the degree of controlled processing that occurs after an error. Of specific importance within the current theory is the role of the OR in generating conscious error awareness Wessel, 2012) . The current theory proposes that error awareness is proportional to the magnitude of the automatically generated OR, and-in turn-many of the controlled adaptations implemented after the automatic cascade are proportional to the degree of error awareness. Admittedly, it is not perfectly clear at this point which exact post-error processes necessitate conscious processing, and the role of error awareness in most of the controlled adaptations described above has not been sufficiently explored yet. However, there is some degree of agreement in the literature on the fact that PES does seem to be influenced by the conscious perception of an error. In other words, action errors that were not consciously perceived as such do not result in PES (Klein et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Wessel et al., 2011) , at least in standard reaction time paradigms (however, see Logan & Crump, 2010) . Moreover, in line with the argument made by the current theory, PES and error awareness seem to be directly related to measures of the post-error OR. For example, pupil dilation (Wessel et al., 2011) , heart rate deceleration (Wessel et al., 2011) , and the magnitude of the skin conductance response (O'Connell et al., 2007) all show significantly increased magnitudes for consciously perceived versus unperceived errors. These indices of autonomic nervous system activity are related to the orienting response after errors . Furthermore, PES and autonomic signatures of the orienting response are not only both increased for consciously perceived errors, but both seem to be directly related: Murphy et al., (Murphy, van Moort, & Nieuwenhuis, 2016 ) used a single-trial general linear model to show that increases in PES (and post-error accuracy) were positively correlated with the post-error pupil dilation response, which provides first evidence for this association. Moreover, this study also shows evidence for the association between the early, automated stage of posterror processing, and later, controlled adjustments of post-error behavior. Furthermore, early investigations of the autonomic response after errors have shown that the degree of heart-rate deceleration and the Pe-ERP are related to PES across subjects (Hajcak et al., 2003) . Hence, the strength of the OR after errors does seem to be related to adaptive post-error adjustments. Furthermore, these adjustments do seem to be related on conscious perception of the action error, which in turn is associated with increased orienting-response-like post-error activity.
| S ECTI O N IV : I MP LI CATI O NS AND P R EDI CTI O NS
The final section of this article contains a discussion of some specific implications of the current theory. It also contains a list of specific hypotheses that can be derived from the theory for the purposes of falsification.
| How is the interruption of ongoing processing adaptive?
The current theory proposes the existence of a universal neural mechanism that is recruited to automatically interrupt ongoing cognitive and motor representations when actions do not have the expected outcome-or, more generally, when the behaviorally relevant environment behaves in a way that is unpredicted. Evolutionarily, it makes sense for the cognitive system to implement rapid interruption of the ongoing task set in case of an expectancy violation (such as an error). For example, if a human is gathering food and mistakes a snake on the ground for a piece of fruit, it is highly adaptive for the cognitive system to rapidly interrupt all ongoing motor (reaching for the fruit) and cognitive (planning where to store the fruit) processing, in favor of freeing up resources for immediate evasion of the snake and revision of the current action plan. Errors likely tap into this system: in case of an error, the expectancy violation is provided by the unexpected mismatch between the intended and the actual action outcome (either on the level of motor plan vs. action emission or on the level of action vs. outcome). This reaction on the part of the organism would be adaptive insofar as that it is geared at alleviating the immediate consequences of the unintended action outcome (if the fruit turns out to be a snake, continuing to reach for it is suboptimal behavior). It is here argued that this interruption aids the improvement of subsequent behavior, whereas the improvement itself is implemented by chronologically later, slower, controlled processes (e.g., during the continued search for food, perceptual discrimination between fruit and snake needs to be improved). Importantly, the key factor that will determine post-error accuracy within this theory, as well as others (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; D. Laming, 1979) , is the available time to adapt behavior until the next action is to be performed (Figure 4) . It is important to realize that most laboratory situations that are designed to test post-error processing are often ill-suited to mimic realistic circumstances: in laboratory experiments, participants are asked to repeat the same (or very similar) actions sequentially and under time pressure, often with very little time to adapt after error commission. Arguably, there are a few real-world situations in which this is the case (i.e., in which very similar or even repetitive actions have to be performed in immediate succession and with very little time to adapt before the next attempt). However, even though these situations exist, most of them are arguably neither immediately relevant to survival, nor are they common. One example would be performing a musical piece as part of an ensemble. In that scenario, the processing of a misplayed note should indeed ideally not interfere with ongoing performance, and actions should go on uninterrupted, even after a mistake. However, arguably the vast majority of situations in the real world actually allow a significantly longer period of time than in this example, and-importantly, than in many examples from laboratory experiments of action error processing (mostly speeded reaction time tasks). Even in real-world situations in which quick adaptations are of crucial importance and time to adapt is indeed very limited, humans are usually not required to perform the exact same action immediately after error commission (as is the case in laboratory experiments). Instead, they have to initiate a new, different action to correct the error before they repeat the previously suboptimally performed action (e.g., shifting into the wrong gear in a car). Therefore, from the vantage point of the current theory, many laboratory situations in which very short ITIs separate two identical types of actions do not fully reflect the real-life situations that our error/unexpectancy processing systems have evolved to address. Hence, the strong interpretation of this proposal would be to say that post-error decreases in accuracy may be methodological artifacts of psychological experiments, which may vanish when realistic times to adapt are given. Importantly, this is not to say that we cannot learn a great deal about error processing from these types of experiments (especially about the effects of the here-proposed early, "automatic" stages of processing).
| Two types of post-error slowing
The predictions of the current theory regarding the relationship between post-error slowing and post-error changes in accuracy and the dependency of this relationship on the available time to adapt is outlined in Figure 4 . One key concomitant of the current theory is that there are two different types of PES, the relative degree of which depends on the timing of the next stimulus relative to the chronological time point of the post-error processing cycle that is ongoing at that time. In other words, the behavioral phenomenon of PES may reflect different processes depending on the circumstances, which are dictated by the timing of the next task-relevant stimulus after error commission and therefore subject to experimental control.
The two different types of post-error slowing proposed by the current theory are strategic PES and orienting-related PES. Strategic PES is a slow, deliberative process, whereas orienting-related PES is the result of a lack of time to complete the automatic and controlled post-error processes (Figure 4) . Orienting-related PES results from a premature stimulus presentation before the end of the post-error processing cycle, which necessitates a premature "reorienting" of attention, back toward the initial task set, even though the source of the expectancy violation has not been identified (Figure 4 , top) or adaptive processing has not finished (Figure 4, middle) . Assuming these two independent hypothetical mechanisms that could result in PES, the relationship between PES and post-error accuracy and their dependency on the time to adapt behavior becomes straightforward and can be illustrated using three exemplary theoretical cases. First, if a task-relevant stimulus that necessitates a rapid response (according to the present task set) is presented during the "critical time period" when the current task set is suppressed (i.e., while the automatic cascade of inhibition-reorienting is still ongoing, Figure 4 ), it will take additional time to reinstantiate the original task set to allow for an appropriate response. In this case, if time pressure is strong enough to necessitate response FIGU RE 4 Different scenarios underlying post-error slowing. The first two scenarios describe situations in which the next imperative stimulus is presented during the proposed automatic cascade (Scenario 1) or during the controlled processing (Scenario 2). In both scenarios, a premature reorienting of attention toward the prior task set is necessary, leading to an interruption of the implementation of the adaptive measures. Hence, in this scenario, post-error slowing will result from the delay associated with the reorienting of attention back toward the task set, whereas post-error accuracy will be negatively affected (Scenario 1, task set inhibited), or unchanged (Scenario 2, adaptive measures prematurely cancelled). Only in Scenario 3, where the stimulus is presented after the critical time period is over, will post-error slowing lead to increased post-error accuracy, as PES results from actual strategic adjustments to the task set. Note that such strategic PES will only occur when the error resulted from premature responding initiation within that critical time window, responses made to such stimuli will be close to chance level, and therefore, despite a considerable amount of slowing (resulting from the necessary reorienting away from the source of the expectancy violation and back toward the original, unchanged task set), will not result in increased post-error accuracy. Second, if a task-relevant stimulus that necessitates a rapid response (according to the present task set) is presented after the source of the error is identified, but before the appropriate post-error adaptations of the task set are finalized, performance will not benefit either, and may in fact be negatively affected by the fact that mental resources are "tied up" in the fine tuning of the sensorimotor system (this would be akin to the case of the bottleneck proposed by Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009) . In this case, post-error slowing would still result from a necessary reorienting of attention toward the initial task set, but no accuracy benefit will be observed. Third, if a task-relevant stimulus that necessitates a rapid response (according to the present task set) is presented after both the automatic and the controlled post-error processes are finished and the task set has been appropriately reconfigured, PES will no longer result from attentional disengagement from the current task set, but is instead most likely to result from a strategic speed accuracy trade off. Only in this scenario will an error result in both post-error slowing and post-error increases in accuracy.
There already is recent behavioral evidence supporting the fact that there are two dissociable types of PES, with one being transient (and potentially orienting related), and the other being more long lasting (Steinhauser, Ernst, & Ibald, 2017) . Importantly, the current theory makes the specific prediction that strategic PES, as an error-specific process that is deliberately invoked, will only occur when it is strategically beneficial with regard to the source of the error. In other words, only when an error was caused by premature, overly fast responding (as is typical in most speeded response-time paradigms such as the flanker, Simon, or Stroop tasks, where error reaction times are faster than correct reaction times) will there be strategic PES, because only under those circumstances will a slowing of responses be adaptive within the context of the error. This prediction is easily testable (see Box 1).
Clearly, these predictions are tightly related to the predictions made by the maladaptive orienting (Notebaert et al., 2009 ) and bottleneck accounts (Jenztsch & Dudschig, 2009 ) of error processing. However, within the current theory, the mechanisms assumed to underlie post-error accuracy deficits in these theories are actually proposed to subserve adaptive processing. Hence, post-error reductions in accuracy related to these processes are explicitly proposed to be an epiphenomenon of task design, specifically when laboratory tasks are designed that (purposefully or not) do not appropriately mimic the kinds of real-world scenarios that these mechanisms are purported to have evolved to address.
| S UM M ARY
The proposal of an orienting response and an attentional bottleneck after errors is a key tenet of maladaptive theories of BOX 1 Predictions derived from the current theory If errors invoke an automatic cascade involving motor inhibition, corticospinal excitability should be reduced in taskunrelated motor effectors within the first 200-300 ms after error commission. Since unexpected perceptual events presented immediately after stop signals lead to better motor inhibition (Wessel, 2017a) , the same should be true for error commission. Artificial disruption of the frontobasal ganglia network that subserves inhibition or the networks subserving attentional orienting at the time of error commission should impair subsequent controlled processing and ultimately lead to worse post-error accuracy. Artificial changes (e.g., via noradrenergic medication) in phasic autonomic excitability underlying the OR should in/ decrease conscious error awareness and potentially associated strategic adaptations post-error. At long ITIs, PES will be almost exclusively due to controlled processing (strategic PES). Therefore, it should only occur for errors resulting from premature responses. Neural mechanisms associated with task-switching should be active after error commission. Errors that were not consciously perceived should not lead to adjustments of motor threshold, response criteria, and/ or tuning of sensory systems. Clinical disorders that are associated with poor inhibitory control and/or attentional orienting should result in worse post-error adaptations.
error processing. The current theory unites such theories with adaptive theories of error processing, which propose that post-error processing is inherently adaptive (i.e., geared at improving behavior). The theory proposes that errors induce a quick, automatic cascade of processing, which includes a momentary inhibition of cognitive (and motor) processing as well as attentional orienting. However, contrary to the maladaptive theories, the current theory proposes that this automatic cascade promotes a shift in attention that is beneficial to (and potentially even necessary for) the initiation of subsequent, slower, adaptive, controlled post-error processes that are geared at tuning the task set to improve accuracy. The theory contains a neural mechanistic model of how the automatic cascade of inhibition and orienting is potentially implemented in the brain. It can account for many existing results previously thought to be incommensurable, and leads to several immediately testable predictions.
Indeed, there are many open questions in regard to the specific predictions made by the proposed theory. In a sense, this theory is at the same time of limited novelty (most of its predictions have been made by other researchers in existing work) and on soft empirical footing (many of its tenets are still subject to empirical testing or have been derived indirectly from studies designed to test other ideas). Hopefully, however, this article can serve as a list of preliminary ideas for future tests of the relationship between performancemonitoring, inhibitory control, attentional (re)orienting, and strategic adaptations to ongoing behavior.
